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COMPULSORY LICENSING OF GENE PATENTS
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
William G. Paga´n1
I. Introduction
Recent decisions holding that gene patents are valid create a po-
tential for placing research and development of genetic medical solu-
tions at odds with public policy.  The risk of populations being sub-
ject to a genetic epidemic is increasing.  Nuclear proliferation,
environmental degradation, and the pervasive adoption of new tech-
nologies are but a few examples of potential sources for wide-scale
genetic damage to a population.  Should such an epidemic occur, the
exclusive right to practice certain gene patents could hold the lives of
millions for ransom during a time of national crisis due to the impor-
tance of such patents in medical diagnostics and clinical treatment.
Many governments, including the United States, have laws that allow
their nations to grant a compulsory license to patents in such scena-
rios.2  Relief against the United States is available when the federal
government infringes a patent, but not to the same extent as would be
available when a private party infringes a patent.3  While other coun-
tries have wantonly exercised their power to grant compulsory li-
censes with little recompense back to patent holders who have made
substantial investment in various medical advances,4 the United
1. William G. Paga´n, candidate for Juris Doctor, North Carolina Central
University School of Law, May 2014, Master of Computer Science from North
Carolina State University, 2003, and B.S. in Computer Science from Pace
University, 1999.  William G. Paga´n is a Registered Patent Agent, currently
working at IBM as a Patent Engineer and Master Inventor.  The views expressed
herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of IBM or its affiliates.
Special thanks are extended to my wife Candice Coletrane-Paga´n, without whom I
could not possibly accomplish so much with so little time.  This paper is dedicated
to my daughter, Gabrielle Rosa Paga´n, who inspires my greatest deeds.
2. Peter Maybarduk & Sarah Rimmington, Compulsory Licenses: A Tool to
Improve Global Access to the HPV Vaccine?, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 323, 328
(2009).
3. B.E. Meyers & Co., Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 375, 380 (Fed. Cl.
2000) (“Because the government has the right to use patented inventions for the
public good, infringement by the government is treated as an exercise of eminent
domain, rather than tortious conduct, as would be the case with private litigants.”).
4. Aileen M. McGill, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceuticals:
Why a WTO Administrative Body Should Determine What Constitutes a Public
93
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States offers a compromise between capricious government patent in-
fringement and oppressive corporate exploitation of public crises.
This article discusses how compulsory licensing has been used
internationally in response to public health issues of varying degrees
and argues that the United States has a legal framework for patents
that enables it to equitably balance between public health and private
industry interests.  This article also explores the patentability of iso-
lated gene sequences in the United States and proposes that the
breadth of exclusivity they could enjoy makes fair compulsory licens-
ing solutions critical.
II. The Threat of Genetic Damage to the Public
It wasn’t long after the United States unveiled nuclear weapons
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II that scientists were
able to confirm a direct correlation between radiation and genetic
damage.5  Almost 70 years later, Japan would again suffer a major
nuclear event after an earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused the
release of radioactive materials from the Fukushima Nuclear Power
Plant.6  Such major nuclear disasters dramatically increase the inci-
dence of various cancers and genetic inconsistencies in surrounding
populations.7  In the absence of a major nuclear event, there still re-
mains a globally ubiquitous background level of radiation from natu-
rally-occurring and man-made sources.8  The effect of persistent low-
dose background radiation on human health is not entirely known,9
but the average annual exposure in the United States is increasing as
a result of the adoption of new technologies.10  A typical computed
Health Crisis Under the Doha Declaration, 10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L. J.
69, 89 (2009) (discussing Egypt’s issuance of compulsory licenses to Viagra).
5. A. JAMIE CUTICCHIA, GENETICS: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 18 (2010).
6. Leonid Maksymov, Environment Related Problems Caused by Tohoku
Earthquake and Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, JAPAN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION
FORUM, http://www.jeef.or.jp/yelp/2012/02/environment-related-problems-caused-
by-tohoku-earthquake-and-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
7. Id.
8. Linnea E. Wahl, Environmental Radiation, HEALTH PHYSICS SOCIETY (Jan.
2010), http://hps.org/documents/environmental_radiation_fact_sheet.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Mark Fishetti, Exposed: Medical Imaging Delivers Big Doses of
Radiation, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (May 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article.cfm?id=exposed-graphic-science.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NCP\6-1\NCP103.txt unknown Seq: 3  9-APR-13 15:19
2013] COMPULSORY LICENSING OF GENE PATENTS 95
tomography scan (popularly known as a “CT scan”)11 of the abdo-
men, for example, subjects the body to approximately 8 millisieverts
of radiation.12  By contrast, Japanese atomic bomb survivors have
presented a small, but demonstrable, increase in cancer mortality risk
after exposure to between 5 and 20 millisieverts.13
III. Gene Patents
The United States Constitution empowers inventors to be
granted “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries” for a limited time “to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”14  By obtaining a patent, an inventor is granted “the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale,” import-
ing or selling anywhere in the United States either the invention, or
products made therefrom.15  This “right to exclude” typically lasts for
twenty years, extending from the date the patent application is filed,16
and creates a monopoly power that allows the patent holder “to set
prices with relative impunity.”17  This exclusive right often benefits
the public since it incentivizes companies to bear the risk and ex-
pense of researching and developing new technologies.18  Patents also
protect innovators from those who would opportunistically copy sci-
entific and technical breakthroughs without bearing any portion of
the initial development costs.19  To qualify for patent protection,
however, a new discovery must qualify as a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and use-
ful improvement thereof.”20  The extent to which isolated genes can
11. See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., What is Computed Tomography?, FDA
.GOV (Jun. 6, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/radiation-emittingproducts/radiation
emittingproductsandprocedures/medicalimaging/medicalx-rays/ucm115318.htm (A
CT scan passes x-ray radiation through the body to generate an image of the body’s
internals.).
12. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Radiation-Emitting Products, FDA.GOV
(Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/radiation-emittingproducts/radiationemitting
productsandprocedures/medicalimaging/medicalx-rays/ucm115329.htm.
13. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
16. Id.
17. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW BASICS § 1:4 (2011).
18. Bratislav Stankovic & Mirjana Stankovic, The Selfish Patent, 3 CASE W.
RESERVE J. L. TECH. & INTERNET 195, 208 (2012).
19. MILLS III, supra note 17, at § 1:3.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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be considered patent-eligible subject matter within this definition has
been the subject of much debate.21
The case Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trade-
mark Office (Myriad I), held that isolated genes are patentable, over-
turning the decision of the District Court.22  This decision, however,
was vacated and remanded for reconsideration23 in view of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prome-
theus Laboratories, Inc. (Prometheus).24  Upon reconsideration, the
Federal Circuit held that “Mayo does not control the question of pat-
ent-eligibility of” isolated DNA molecules.25  The Federal Circuit’s
second Myriad decision (Myriad II) provides the most current analy-
sis on the patentability of isolated genes.26
In Myriad I, Plaintiffs challenged the validity of Defendants’
patents related to the isolation of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes as
“patent-ineligible products of nature under [35 U.S.C.] § 101”27 since
such molecules “retain the same nucleotide sequence as native
DNAs.”28  The court disagreed with the Plaintiffs and the court be-
low, holding that “the patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is not
negated because it has similar informational properties to a different,
more complex natural material that embodies it.”29  The Court held
that what makes isolated DNA molecules patentable is neither “their
informational content,” nor the “molecules in terms of their uses” but
that “genes are in fact materials having a chemical nature and, as
such, are best described in patents by their structures rather than their
21. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16,
2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) and opinion vacated, appeal
reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). (This case is herein referred to as
Myriad I.).
22. Id.
23. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012).
24. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc, 132 S.Ct. 1289
(2012). (This case is herein referred to as Prometheus.).
25. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689
F.3d 1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 2012 WL 4502947 (U.S.
Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 12-398). (This case is herein referred to as Myriad II.).
26. Id.
27. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334. (Myriad I).
28. Id. at 1353.
29. Id.
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functions.”30  Thus, “[b]ecause isolated DNAs . . . have a markedly
different chemical structure compared to native DNAs[,]” the court
found isolated DNAs to be patent-eligible.31
The Supreme Court vacated the Myriad I decision and asked the
Federal Circuit to reconsider its holding in light of the Prometheus
decision.32  In Prometheus, Plaintiffs challenged the validity of De-
fendant’s patent claims that taught improvements to the way autoim-
mune diseases can be treated using thiopurine drugs.33  The key claim
at issue argued that a physician could improve treatment by taking
the following steps: (1) administering a small amount of 6-thi-
oguanine, (2) monitoring the extent to which a patient’s body metab-
olizes the drug, and (3) giving either more or less of the drug in a
subsequent dose so as to keep the amount of drug in the patient’s
blood stream below a toxicity level and above a minimum efficacy
level.34  The Supreme Court held that this claim simply tells a doctor
to apply relevant, natural laws and take “conventional” and “routine”
steps thereafter.35  The court thus held that these steps, “when viewed
as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts
taken separately,” and held Defendant’s claim invalid.36
The Federal Court in Myriad II, however, held that Prometheus:
does not control the question of patent-eligibility of [isolated
DNA molecules because they are] expressly authorized as suita-
ble patent-eligible subject matter in [35 U.S.C.] § 101.  [Specifi-
cally, the court held that] [t]he isolated DNA molecules before us
are not found in nature.  They are obtained in the laboratory and
are man-made, the product of human ingenuity.37
Indeed, the decision in Prometheus was silent as to claims related to
genes as compositions of matter, dealing instead with method claims
in the application of drugs.38  The consequence of holding that an
isolated gene is patentable is that the holder of such a patent would
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012).
33. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294-95. (Prometheus).
34. Id. at 1295.
35. Id. at 1297-98.
36. Id. at 1298.
37. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1325. (Myriad II).
38. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1295. (Prometheus).
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have the right to exclude “anyone from working with” the claimed
isolated gene.39
At issue in the Myriad cases were the isolated BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes, which are useful in determining whether a woman is
at increased risk of breast and/or ovarian cancer.40  Such broad patent
claims, when exclusively licensed, have been blamed for delaying the
emergence of relevant diagnostic tests and the development of mar-
kets therefrom.41  A case study concluded in 2010 at the Duke Insti-
tute for Genome Sciences & Policy contrasted exclusively licensed
gene test markets with non-exclusively licensed gene test markets.42
The results suggested that the science for non-exclusively licensed
tests was more advanced and enjoyed a healthier market.43  If the
purpose of patents is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,”44 then this case study suggests that a strict patent enforcement
model is not-optimal.45
Other studies, however, have found such concerns to be over-
blown.46  A study by the National Academy of Sciences in 2003
found that “asserting exclusivity could confer a benefit by increasing
the incentives to do research to discover the target first.”47  This
might then motivate further investment in that research.48  A second
study conducted by the National Academy of Sciences in 2005 then
found that patents caused only 3% of respondents to abandon a re-
search project.49
Gene patenting proponents suggest that a deleterious effect to
the science and market for biotechnology is nothing to be worried
about and that such fear is “fueled by groups with a certain political
agenda that is antithetical to patenting.”50  However, the effects of an
39. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1326. (Myriad II).
40. Id. at 1309.
41. Kendall Morgan, Patents Block Competition, Slow Innovation in Gene
Testing, DUKE INSTITUTE FOR GENOME SCIENCES & POLICY (Apr. 14, 2010), http://
www.genome.duke.edu/press/news/post.php?s=2010-04-14-patents-block-competi
tion-slow-innovation-in-gene-testing.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
45. Morgan, supra note 41.
46. Stankovic & Stankovic, supra note 18 at 206.
47. Id. at 207.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 208.
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exclusive right to sell in the midst of a public health epidemic have
already been observed in other countries.51  In 2001, when almost
four million South Africans were infected by HIV, necessary AIDS-
fighting drug cocktails that could have been sold for as little as $350
(U.S. dollars) per person, per year were instead sold for $10,000 per
person, per year due to patent-protected pricing.52  The Coalition of
South African Trade Unions accused drug company patents of
“hold[ing] at ransom the health of [their] nation.”53  After much inter-
national debate, South Africa’s solution was to enact legislation per-
mitting compulsory licensing.54  Compulsory licensing allows the
state to license a patent without the patent holder’s permission.55  To
address the need for countries to protect against being held hostage
by strict intellectual property protections, the practice of compulsory
licensing would become officially endorsed by the World Trade Or-
ganization (“WTO”) under the Doha Declaration.56
IV. The TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration
Members of the WTO, such as the United States, are required to
provide a minimum level of intellectual property protection to trading
partners under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).57  The initial goal of TRIPS was to
guarantee patent protections among international trade partners and
establish a means for enforcement.58  However, the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic, combined with exorbitant patent-protected drug prices, forced
51. Jonathan King, Life Patents and AIDS Drug Access, GENEWATCH
(November 2001), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/ViewPage.aspx?
pageId=164.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on Trips
and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 291, 312 (2002).
55. Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, PLOS MED.
(Jan. 2012), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2F
journal.pmed.1001154.
56. Michael A. Santoro, Human Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral
Principles Justifying Third World Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs, 31 N. C.
J. INT’L L & COM. REG. 923, 930 (2006).
57. Gathii, supra note 54, at 294.
58. Id.
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nations to revisit TRIPS in 2001.59  The result of this special session
of the WTO was the Doha Declaration.60
The Doha Declaration emphasizes that under TRIPS, countries
have “the right to grant compulsory licenses” in times of national
emergency.61  What constitutes a national emergency is left to mem-
bers of the WTO to decide, but “public health crises,” such as the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, can qualify.62  Since 2001, compulsory li-
censes have been issued on at least twelve separate occasions world-
wide.63  Even the United States, who was initially opposed to a sepa-
rate WTO declaration supporting compulsory licensing,64 used the
threat of compulsory licensing to force German pharmaceutical com-
pany Bayer into selling the Ciproflaxin antibiotic at a deep discount
in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subse-
quent Anthrax scare.65  The potential for abuse of this mechanism is
perhaps best illustrated by Egypt’s authorization of a compulsory li-
cense to any company seeking to manufacture Viagra, a drug pat-
ented by Pfizer that is used to treat erectile dysfunction.66  As a con-
sequence of Egypt’s use of compulsory licensing for Viagra, Pfizer
abandoned its plans to build a manufacturing facility in Egypt, and
overall Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Egypt plummeted.67
Thus, an overly-liberal patent-breaking scheme enables the state to
deprive patent holders of the fair value of their patents68 and can
strongly deter foreign investment.69
V. Remedies Available for Government Infringement
When the United States infringes or authorizes infringement
upon a patent, relief is available under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.70  An action
59. Id. at 296.
60. Id. at 292.
61. Santoro, supra note 56, at 930.
62. Id.
63. Beall & Kuhn, supra note 55 (Table 1 of this reference shows the
incidents and countries that have issued compulsory licenses to address diseases
from 2001 to 2010.).
64. Gathii, supra note 54, at 296-97.
65. McGill, supra note 4, at 87.
66. Id. at 90.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 87.
69. Id. at 90.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012).
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against the United States for patent infringement must be brought in
the Court of Federal Claims, and any third parties who are infringing
under the Government’s consent are immune from suit.71
In a typical suit for patent infringement filed against a private
party, tort principles, such as the willfulness or reasonableness of the
act, can enhance the damages award by up to three times.72  This is
not the case in an infringement action against the United States.73
Federal case law has established that “the government has the right to
use patented inventions for the public good,” and as such, infringe-
ment actions brought against the United States are “treated as an ex-
ercise of eminent domain, rather than tortious conduct.”74  Thus, the
Government “is not an ordinary infringer, but rather a compulsory,
nonexclusive licensee.”75  As an act of eminent domain, the Govern-
ment’s infringement cannot be enjoined by injunctive relief.76  Attor-
ney fees and costs are also not available if the Government’s actions
are considered by the Court to be “substantially justified” or if such
an award would be unjust.77  Essentially, if the United States wants to
use an isolated gene that it knows is patented without a license from
the patent holder, it could do so willfully and continually without
incurring an equitable or punitive penalty.78
VI. Reasonable Recovery Due to
Government Infringement
When the Government takes a compulsory license, the patent
holder is entitled to “recovery of his reasonable and entire compensa-
tion for such use and manufacture.”79  The preferred method for cal-
culating this recovery is to determine a “reasonable royalty for the
license” and apply an interest rate that accrues from the date of the
71. David R. Lipson, We’re Not Under Title 35 Anymore: Patent Litigation
Against the United States Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), 33 PUB. CONT. L. J. 243, 244
(2003).
72. Id. at 257.
73. B.E. Meyers & Co., Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 375, 380 (Fed. Cl.
2000).
74. Id.
75. Standard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 757 (Fed. Cl.
1999).
76. Martin v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 627, 632 (Fed. Cl. 2011).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012).
78. B.E. Meyers & Co., 47 Fed. Cl. at 380.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012).
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taking to the date of payment in order to offset any payment delay.80
If the infringed patent has already been licensed to others for a roy-
alty, then the rate others enjoy is typically what will be adopted as
reasonable.81  However, given that gene patents are commonly used
to exclude all competitors, or are exclusively licensed to a single
practitioner,82 computation of a reasonable royalty in such cases may
need to be made on a case-by-case basis.83
In the absence of an existing royalty upon which to base recov-
ery, the Court imagines a hypothetical encounter between a willing
buyer and willing seller to determine what a negotiated licensing
agreement would have been between the parties.84  The actual will-
ingness of the parties to negotiate is irrelevant in this determination.85
The ability of the patent holder to exact an exorbitant sum from pri-
vate users under normal market conditions is also irrelevant since the
goal of a reasonable royalty is not to determine the sum that the mar-
ket would have yielded among private users.86  Rather, the goal of a
reasonable royalty is to fulfill the “just compensation clause of the
Fifth Amendment” pertaining to eminent domain takings by the Gov-
ernment.87  Therefore, the patent holder’s recovery will be based on
“what the owner has lost, not what the taker has gained.”88
Determining a royalty depends on determining a royalty base,
which represents the entire market value of the infringing product,89
and a royalty rate, which represents a percentage of the royalty base
to which the patent holder is entitled.90  The royalty base is not in-
tended to “include items that merely constitute spare or additional
parts or supplies.”91  However, the royalty base shall include items
that have a “financial and marketing dependence on the patented
80. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167-68 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
81. Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1977) opinion
modified on denial of reh’g, 557 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
82. Morgan, supra note 41.
83. Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 347.
84. Id. at 349.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 351.
87. Id.
88. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (citing
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 76 (1913)).
89. Decca Ltd., 640 F.2d at 1175.
90. Id.
91. Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204, 210-11 (Fed. Cl. 1996)
aff’d, 152 F.3d 946 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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item.”92  Since a gene patent can cover the gene itself, the manner in
which it is produced, the apparatus that administers the genetic test,
and the diagnostic process itself, there might not be anything of sig-
nificant value that is excluded from the royalty base.93  When the
infringed patent contributes such a dramatic amount of the total prod-
uct’s value, the royalty base could very well be all sales revenue of
the infringing product.94
The computation of a royalty rate is far more complex and heav-
ily leverages the fifteen factors laid out in the case Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.95  Given the multivariate and fact-spe-
cific nature of a royalty rate analysis, perhaps the best view into what
rates Courts have held to be reasonable can be found by examining
what Courts have awarded in the past.96  In a study of all cases
awarding reasonable royalties in trial verdicts between 1982 and mid-
2005, biotechnology cases averaged 9.6%.97  This rate tends to be
substantially higher than what would actually be negotiated.98  The
nature of this study tended to reflect amounts awarded in court opin-
ions rather than by jury verdicts,99 which is helpful in this analysis
since actions against the Government in the Court of Federal Claims
are exclusively bench trials.100  It should be noted, however, that this
study is not exclusive to claims against the government,101 so these
rates may be higher than what should be expected in an action under
28 U.S.C. § 1498.102
92. Leesona Corp., 599 F.2d at 974.
93. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995).
94. The Boeing Co. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 303, 316. (Fed. Cl. 2009).
95. JEFFREY A. FINN, PATENT LITIGATION § 14:2.6 (Laurence H. Pretty ed., 2d
ed. 2012) (citing Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) modified sub nom. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-
Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971)).
96. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2030-32 (2007).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2032-33 n.134 (explaining that negotiated rates tend to be
substantially lower than litigated rates).
99. Id. at 2031.
100. R.C.F.C. Rule 38 (2012).
101. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 96, at 2049.
102. Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 351.
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Even so, a 10% royalty rate against the Government is not un-
precedented.103  In Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, the Court
awarded a 10% royalty rate based on “the unwillingness of Gargoyles
to license their patent, the obvious value the patent holds in sus-
taining Gargoyles as a viable, profitable company, and the fact that
the government’s actions placed [the infringing government contrac-
tor] in a very favorable position from which to compete more effec-
tively with Gargoyles in the future.”104  Since these conditions are
also widespread for institutions that develop gene patents, a 10% roy-
alty rate for government infringed gene patents might be reasonable
to expect.105
By contrast, in the case The Boeing Co., Inc. v. United States, a
royalty rate of 1.25% was deemed reasonable since there was evi-
dence that Boeing had offered this royalty rate to various manufactur-
ers for the patent at issue.106  This reinforces the Court’s preference
toward using existing deals to determine a reasonable rate, rather than
formulating their own rate.107  This 1.25% royalty rate, however, was
proposed with the entire infringing $1.24 billion contract acting as
the royalty base.108  The award to Boeing of $16.9 million is thus
viewed as a shift toward enforcing greater Government liability de-
spite the seemingly small royalty rate determination.109  A trend to-
ward greater Government liability, in combination with the Court’s
willingness to compute high royalty rates as in Gargoyles decision,
implies that a gene patent subjected to a compulsory license could be
deserving of a substantial award.110
VII. Conclusion
Pursuing relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 might be the most uni-
versally just method for patent holders to be compensated when the
United States infringes a patent.  A patent system that bars any form
103. Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 95, 108 (Fed. Cl. 1997),
aff’d, 113 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
104. Id.
105. Morgan, supra note 41.
106. The Boeing Co., 86 Fed. Cl. at 312-13.
107. Decca Ltd., 640 F.2d at 1167-68.
108. Timothy R. Wyatt, In Search of “Reasonable Compensation”: Patent
Infringement by Defense Contractors with the Authorization and Consent of the
U.S. Government, 20 FED. CIR. B. J. 79, 98 (2010).
109. Id. at 97-98.
110. Gargoyles, Inc., 37 FED. Cl. at 108.
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of compulsory licensing would give private companies the authority
to completely withhold medical treatment from the public or set out-
rageous prices that make treatment available only to the very rich.  In
such a system, a sufficiently serious epidemic could kill millions of
Americans and create widespread civil unrest as the desperate poor
protest, riot, or worse.  On the other hand, a patent system that liber-
ally breaks patents to make cheap generic treatments available to the
public would demotivate biotechnology companies from researching
and developing these necessary treatments in the first place.  Conse-
quently, the United States would lose the ability to export valuable
products and services, the American economy would suffer, and
American scientists would find themselves increasingly unemployed
as biotechnology companies move their research to foreign countries.
28 U.S.C. § 1498 allows patent holders to bring a patent in-
fringement action against the Government so that the Court of Fed-
eral Claims can provide a check against the tyranny of these two
extremes.  There is ample case law demonstrating that the United
States is willing and legally-enabled to take compulsory licenses for
patents in the public interest.  The international community also sup-
ports taking compulsory licenses in times of a true national health
crisis because it is necessary to protect the public from companies
that would jeopardize public health to maximize profits.  Given the
breadth of patent claims for isolated genes as compositions of matter,
it may be just a matter of time before the taking of a compulsory
patent becomes necessary.  The application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 by
the Court, however, has also protected the interests of private indus-
try in the past.  While damages against the United States are strictly
monetary and are limited to just compensation under an eminent do-
main takings theory of recovery, recent royalty determinations seem
to be increasingly favoring the patent holder.  As such, patent holders
should feel secure in their decision to research and develop patents in
the United States, because on the off chance that the Government
decides a compulsory license is necessary, the Court has historically
ordered monetary recovery that is reasonable to protect their
investment.
